Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Ben Harries D/B/A Carriage House Kitchens v.
Bernard E. Valgardson, Robert J. Ehlers and Norma
Ehlers, his Wife : Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Mabey, Ronnow, Madsen & Marsden; Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Harries v. Valgardson, No. 10829 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4008

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BEN HARRIES d/b/a
CARRIAGE HOUSE KITCHENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
BERNARD E. VALGARDSON,
ROBERT J. EHLERS and
NORMA EHLERS, his wife,

Case No.
10829

Defendants-Respondents.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appeal from Summary Judgment of the
Third Judicial District Court
Salt Lake County
Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Judge
MABEY, RONNOW, MADSEN & MARSDEN
574 East Second South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Robert M. Anderson
141 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE........

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.........

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL............

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

LL\.RGill1ENT • • • . • • • . • . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

7

POINT I. THE MATERIALMAN, BEN HARRIES,
(APPELLANT HEREIN) DOING BUSINESS AS
CARRIAGE HOUSE KITCHENS, IS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PURCHASERS,
EHLERS, (RESPONDENTS HEREIN) FOR
$1,475.31 FOR SUPPLYING AND INSTALLING THE KITCHEN CABINETS, DOUBLE
OVEN AND SURFACE UNIT, HOOD, G.E.
DELUXE DISPOSAL, AND DELUXE DISHWASHER AT 4306 PIN OAK STREET, SALT
LAKE CITY, UTAH, UNDER THE BONDING
STATUTE, §14-2-1 BECAUSE PRIOR TO
THE SUPPLYING AND INSTALLING OF SAID
ITEMS BY THE MATERIALMAN, THE PURCHASERS WERE "OWNERS OF ANY INTEREST
IN LAND" AND FAILED TO OBTAIN THE REQUISITE BOND TO PROTECT THEMSELVES
AND THE MATERIALMAN. ...............
7
POINT II. THE MATERIALMAN (HARRIES)
IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT FOR THE

Page
Corry Lombard Lumber Co. vs.
Partridge, 10 U. 322, 37 P. 572 ... 11
King Bros Inc. vs. Utah Dry Kiln
Co., 13 U.2d 339, 374 P.2d 254 .... 10, 11
Liberty Coal and Lumber Co. vs.
Snow, 53 U. 298, 178 P. 341. ......

9

14-2-1 to 14-2-2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 ................... 7, 8,9,10
38-1-1 to 38-1-26, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953 ................... 10
Texts Cited
17 American Jurisprudence 2d ....... 13

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BEN HARRIES d/b/a
0\RRIAGE HOUSE KITCHENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

Case No.
10829

BERNARD E. VALGARDSON,
ROBERT J. EHLERS and
"lORMA EIILERS, his wife,
Defendants-Respondents.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is an appeal from summary judgment granted to Defendants on a materialman's
claim for $1,475.31 for supplying and instal, ling kitchen cabinets, double oven, surface
unit, hood, G.E. deluxe disposal, and deluxe
dishwasher, which said claim for recovery is
grounded on three theories:

(1) §14-2-1,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953, bonding statute
-1-

Cl:lini:

(2) Implied in fact contract claim;

and (3) Implied in law, i.e. nonconsensual

conuact claim.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Summary judgment was granted Defendants
dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint.

Plain-

tiff's [-lotion for Summary Judgment against
Defendant~,

Robert J. Ehlers and Norma

Ehlers was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant-materialman, Ben Harries,
seeks to have the summary judgment reversed
and summary judgment entered for Appellant
for $1,475.31 for the items supplied and
installed.

Or, the materialman at least

seeks to have the case remanded for a trial
of the issues.
~n

Additionally, the material-

seeks as minimal relief, judgment for

S60.00 for the deluxe or fancy items admitted
~ing by Respondents

in their Affidavit

-2-

subject to Respondents being satisfied
concerning ins ta l lat ion of certain "hardware" i terns.

(R-21)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action for $1,475.31 by a
r,,aterialman, Ben Harries d/b/a Carriage
,~,iLJse 1( i

tchens (hereinafter referred to as

"<r,aterialrnan") for kitchen cabinets, double
oven, surface unit, hood, G.E. deluxe dis?osal, and deluxe dishwasher at 4306 Pin
Oak Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

(R-1, 3,

13 and 21)
The items were installed between May
12, 1966 and June 2, 1966. (R-2, 14)
Prior to materialman's supplying and
installing the items mentioned, Bernard
~lgardson,

the builder (R-1, 2) or con-

tractor (R-20),

(hereinafter referred to

as "contractor") had the home, a building,
to a point where it was "framed and sheetrocked". (R-21)

-3-

By Earnest Money Receipt and Offer
to Purchase dated March 3, 1966 and signed
~y

Defendants, Ehlers,

(hereinafter referred

tc~

as "purchasers") April 5, 1966, Valgardson

undertook to sell the home to Defendants,
Ehlers.

(See Exhibit)

The Exhibit (Earnest

Receipt and Offer to Purchase) con-

r~ney

tains an attached sheet specifying all of
the work yet to be performed by the contractor for the purchasers.

(See Exhibit)

The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to
Purchase recites that "kitchen to be arranged
by buyer with appliances of any major brand

in builder's line with top switch disposal,
dishwasher, oven and range and duck less vent."
(R-21)

The value of the kitchen items exceeds

$500.00. (R-2)

The purchasers failed to

obtain a bond as required by §14-2-1, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953. (R-6)

-4-

The purchasers, themselves, drew
their plan for the kitchen. (R-13, 15, 21)

·r1e purchasers examined the cabinets and
appliances at the materialman's store.
(R-13)

The purchasers explained their plan

to the materialman. (R-13)

The materialman

then went back to the home with the purchasers and verified measurements.

The

purchasers then decided that they wanted
some deluxe or fancy type cabinets. (R-13)
Purchaser, Mr. Ehlers, then went back to
the materialman's store where the additional
charge for deluxe cabinets was computed as
$60.00. (R-21)

While at rnaterialrnan's store,

the materialrnan told the purchaser that he
(the materialrnan) would not extend credit to
the contractor. (R-14)
Subsequent to the rnaterialrnan's installation, American Savings & Loan Association
instituted proceedings to foreclose its

-5-

security interest in the house. (R-10)
That action is captioned American Savings
~

L0an Association vs. Bernard E. Valgardson

et al, Civil No. 167585, Third Judicial

District Court, State of Utah. (R-10)

By

judicial notice the Court may take notice
oi the fact that said file now indicates

tha': Robert J. Anderson, as trustee, bought
the home at Sheriff's Sale for $26,519.72.
Purchasers are now using the kitchen cabinets,
double oven, surface unit, hood, G.E. deluxe
disposal, and deluxe dishwasher.

Purchasers

are living in said home and were living in
said home at the time their Answer was filed.
Their address should appear as 4306 Pin Oak
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah on their Answer
in Page 5 of the Record on Appeal pursuant

to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
T>~E

rlATERIALMAN, BEN HARRIES, (AP-

PC:V,A0JT HEREIN) DOING BUSINESS AS CARRIAGE
riOllSE KITCHENS, IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT
:,c,H~ ST

THE PURCHASERS, EHLERS, (RESPONDENTS

HERE:::0:) FOR $1,475.31 FOR SUPPLYING AND INSTALLING THE KITCHEN CABINETS, DOUBLE OVEN
AND SURFACE UNIT, HOOD, G.E. DELUXE DISPOSAL,
A~D

DELUXE DISHWASHER AT 4306 PIN OAK STREET,

SALT LA.KE CITY, UTAH UNDER THE BONDING STATUTE, §14-2-1 BECAUSE PRIOR TO THE SUPPLYING
AND INSTALLING OF SAID ITEMS BY THE MATERIAL~iAi~,

THE PURCHASERS WERE "OWNERS OF ANY

INTEREST IN LAND" AND FAILED TO OBTAIN THE
REQUISITE BOND TO PROTECT THEMSELVES AND
THE MATERIALMAN.
The bonding statute provides:
Section 14-2-1
"The owner of any interest in
land entering into a contract,

-7-

involving $500 or more, for the
construction, addition to, or al'-'-'·~-atil•n or repair of, any buildin.~, s cructure or improvement upon
L~,tJ shall, before any such work is
c>-, ~rnenccd, obtain from the contractor a bond in a sum equal to the
contract price, with good and sufficient sureties, conditioned for
~ l1~' fa i thfu 1 performance of the
: ::. trac c and prompt payment for
.-1 - ;_erial furnished and labor per~- ~med under the contract.
Such
bond shall run to the owner and to
Jll other persons as their interest
nay appear; and any person who has
furnished materials, or performed
laoor for or upon any such building,
structure or improvement, payment
for which has not been made, shall
have a direct right of action against
the sureties upon such bond for the
reasonable value of the materials
furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any case the
prices agreed upon; which right of
action shall accrue forty days after
the completion, or abandonment, or
default in the performance, of the
work provided for in the contract.
The bond herein provided for shall be
exhibited to any person interested,
upon request." (Emphasis added)
Section 14-2-2.
"Any person subject to the provisions
of this chapter, who shall fail to

-8-

obtain such good and sufficient
IH~nd, or to exhibit the same
as
'
h~ccin required, shall be personally liable to all persons who have
furnished materials or performed
L11h)r under the contract for the
reasonable value of such materials
furnished or labor performed, not
exceeding, however, in any case the
rrices agreed upon."
The question for decision here is were
ti~c

purchasers, Ehlers, "owners of any in-

terest in land" for purposes of the bonding
statute?
The purpose of the statute is to prevent owners of land from having their lands
improved with materials and labor furnished
and performed by third parties, and thus to
enhance the value of said lands, without
becoming personally responsible for the
reasonable value of materials and labor.
Liberty Coal and Lumber Co. vs. Swain, 53

U. 298, 178 P. 341
The bond provided for in §14-2-1 and

-9-

14-2-2 is for the purpose of protecting
th2 nu cL:>r ia lrnen

and those furnishing labor

against non-payment of their accounts by
:he contractor.

Bamberger Co. vs. Certified

productions, Inc., 88 U. 194, 211; 48 P.2d

4S9.
Under §14-2-1 a bond may be demanded
f ror,; the contractor to the "lessee" to protect the lessee and the lessor against
mechanics liens.

Bamberger Co. vs. Certi-

fied Productions, Inc., 88 U. 213, 53 P.2d
1153.
~his

chapter protects the laborer and

materialman as well as the landowner.

King

Bros, Inc. vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13 U.2d
339, 374 P.2d 254.

Because of the common purpose of the
mechanics lien statutes (38-1-1 to 38-1-26,

U.C.A., 1953) and contractor's bonds statutes,
Sections 14-2-1 and 14-2-2, and their
-10-

pr3ctically identical language, adjudicati,,ns as to what is lienable under the

[nrmer are helpful in determining the proper
applic0tion of the latter.

King Bros, Inc.

vs. ~~ah Dry Kiln Co., 13 U.2d 339, 374 P.2d
~3~:

One in possession of land under a

contract of pure hase is an "owner" within
the meaning of Section 38-1-3, U,C.A., 1953
(mecha~ic's

lien law).

Corry Lombard Lumber

Co. vs. Partridge, 10 U. 322, 37 P.572.
One having an equitable interest in the premises is an owner within the meaning of
Seccion 38-1-3.

But such lien may also be

extended to any other or greater interest
which such owner may acquire to such property thereafter, and before lien is established by process of law.

Corry Lombard

Co. vs. Partridge, 10 U. 322, 37 P. 572.
In this case the purchasers acquired an
enforceable interest in land upon signing
-11-

the Earnest Money.

The Earnest Money was

ac cu;1 ll ~" more than the typica 1 Uniform Rea 1
::st:"Ltc L)rm in that it contained a second
sheet detailing substantial work to be performed by the contractor.

The Ehlers should

uve obtained a bond to protect themselves

and the materialman.
POINT II
THE MATERIALMAN (HARRIES) IS ENTITLED
TO

JUDG~IBNT

FOR THE $1,475.31 AGAINST EHLERS

FOR THE KITCHEN CABINETS, DOUBLE OVEN, SURFACE UNIT, HOOD, G.E. DELUXE DISPOSAL, AND
DELUXE DISHWASHER FURNISHED AND INSTALLED
AT 4306 PIN OAK STREET, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
BECAUSE EHLERS KNEW THAT THE MATERIALMAN
PERFOfil'IBD THE SERVICES AND INSTALLED THE
GOODS AND EXPECTED HIM TO PAY FOR SAME,
WHICH CONSTITUTES AN IMPLIED IN FACT CONTRACT.
The elements of an implied in fact
contract are:

(1) that the Plaintiff
-12-

performs services and pay is expected,
and (2) the Defendant must

'

or should know

'

that the Plaintiff expects pay for said
goods or services from him.

17 American

Juriscrudence 2nd, pages 334-337, "Contracts",
Sections 3 and 4.
In this case valuable goods were furnished and installed.

The materialman,

Harries, told Mr. Ehlers that he was not
extending credit to Valgardson, clearly
indicating that he was looking to Ehlers
for payment.
be paid.

The materialman expected to

He was certainly not intending

to make a gift of the kitchen cabinets,
double oven, surface unit, hood, G.E.
deluxe disposal, and deluxe dishwasher.
The statement by the materialman to Ehlers
that he was not extending credit to Valgardson was made in the presence of Ehlers

-13-

and an independent witness, Mr. Jim Lozois.

POINT III
TllE J'vlATERIALMAN (HARRIES) IS ENTITLED
TO JUDGMENT AGAINST THE PURCHASERS, EHLERS
(RESPOXDENTS HEREIN) FOR $1,475.31 BECAUSE
SAID h\ TERIALI-IAN FURNISHED SAID GOODS AND
RE~DERED

SAID SERVICES EXPECTING PAY THERE-

FOR AXD CONFERRED A BENEFIT UPON EHLERS,
ru~D

SAID MATERIALMAN WAS NOT AN OFFICIOUS

INTERi"lEDDLER, WHICH THUS CONSTITUTES AN
IMPLIED IN LAW CONTRACT.
The elements of a nonconsensual, or
implied in law contract are:

(1) Plaintiff

must render services and expect pay, (2)
Plaintiff must confer

a benefit

upon the

Defendant, and (3) Plaintiff cannot be an
officious intermeddler.
The materialman, Harries, did render
valuable services and install valuable goods-kitchen cabinets, double oven, surface unit,
-14-

_,_ 00

d, G.E. disposal, and dishwasher.

2 ~pectcd and expects to be paid.

He

These

iccnis \v2re installed between May 12, 1966

anJ June 2, 1966.

Prior thereto, on April

5, 1966, Respondents (Ehlers) had entered
into an Earnest Money Agreement and Offer
To

Purchase the house into which the items

~ere

installed.

They moved into the home

and are living there now.

The materialman

met with them, used their own drawing in planning for and ordering the items.
are using them.

Respondents

The materialman has conferred

a benefit upon the Ehlers, and to allow them
to keep the items without paying the materi-

a lman Harries for them would constitute a
most unjust enrichment!
CONCLUSION
The materialman, Ben Harries, is entitled to be paid by Ehlers for the kitchen
cabinets, double oven, surface unit, hood,
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G.E. disposal, and dishwasher on at least
theories:

The bonding statute, implied in

fact contract, and implied in law contract.
T~ercfore,

for

the trial court summary judgment

d~fendants,

Ehlers, should be reversed

and judgment for $1,475.31 awarded to the
rnaterialman.

In the alternative, the matter

shoulo be remanded for trial.

In any event,

the $60.00 for the deluxe kitchen cabinets
should be paid by Ehlers to the materialman.
DATED this

day of April, 1967.
Respectfully submitted by
MABEY, RONNOW, MADSEN & MARSDEN
By .

~-

.
- ---. . ..(·. '\.. ---- ---..'."--·"\/ .

Milo S. Marsden, Jr.
/
Attorneys_fo~ PlaintifiAppe llant
574 East 2nd South
Salt Lake City, Utah

"

1

Mailed a copy of the foregoing brief to
Robert M. Anderson, attorney for DefendantRespondents, 141 East 1st South, Salt Lake
City, Utah this
?..4; 4- day of April, 196 7.

